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Ethics(1912) Chapter 7. Intrinsic Value.

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Chapter 7. Intrinsic Value. 

The main conclusions, at which we have arrived so far with regard to the theory stated inChapters IandII, may be briefly summed up as follows. I have tried to show, first of all, (1) that to say that a voluntary action isright, oroughtto be done, or iswrong, isnotthe same thing as to say that any being or set of beings whatever, either human or non-human, has towards it any mental attitude whatever梕ither an attitude of feeling, or of willing, or of thinking something about it; and that hence no proof to the effect that any beings, human or non-human, have any such attitude towards an action is sufficient to show that it is right, or ought to be done, or is wrong; and (2) similarly, that to say that any one thing or state of things isintrinsically good, orintrinsically bad, or that one isintrinsically betterthan another, is also not the same thing as to say that any being or set of beings has towards it any mental attitude whatever梕ither an attitude of feeling, or of desiring, or of thinking something about it; and hence that here again no proof to the effect that any being or set of beingshassome such mental attitude towards a given thing or state of things is ever sufficient to show that it is intrinsically good or bad. These two points are extremely important, because the contrary view is very commonly held, in some form or other, and because (though this is not always seen), whatever form it be held in, it is absolutely fatal to one or both of two very fundamental principles, which our theory implies. In many of their forms such views are fatal to the principle (1) that no action is everbothright and wrong; and hence also to the view that there is any characteristic whatever whichalwaysbelongs to right actions andneverto wrong ones; and inalltheir forms they are fatal to the principle, (2) that if it is once the duty of any being to do an action whose total effects will beArather than one whose total effects will beB, it mustalwaysbe the duty of any being to do an action whose total effects will be precisely similar toArather than one whose total effects will be precisely similar toB, if he has to choose between them.(Ch. 7 ?1)

I tried to show, then, first of all, that these two principles may be successfully defended against this first line of attack梩he line of attack which consists in saying (to put it shortly) that搑ight?/Q> and揼ood?/Q> are merelysubjectivepredicates. But we found next that even those who admit and insist (as many do) that搑ight?/Q> and搃ntrinsically good?/Q> arenotsubjective predicates, may yet attack the second principle on another ground. For this second principle implies that the question whether an action is right or wrong must always depend upon itsactualconsequences; and this view is very commonly disputed on one or other of three grounds, namely (1) that it sometimes depends merely on theintrinsic natureof the action, or, in other words, that certain kinds of actions would be absolutely always right, and others absolutely always wrong,whatevertheir consequences might be, or (2) that it depends, partly or wholly, on themotivefrom which the action is done, or (3) that it depends on the question whether the agent hadreason to expectthat its consequences would be the best possible. I tried, accordingly, to show next that each of these three views is untrue.(Ch. 7 ?2)

But, finally, we raised, inthe last chapter, a question as to theprecisesense in which right and wrong dodependupon the actual consequences. And here for the first time we came upon a point as to which it seemed very doubtful whether our thoery was right. All that could be agreed upon was that a voluntary action is right whenever and only when its total consequences areasgood, intrinsically, as any that would have followed from any action which the agentcould havedone instead. But we were unable to arrive at any certain conclusions as to the precise sense in which the phrase揷ould have?/Q>must be understood if this proposition is to be true; and whether, therefore, itistrue, if we give to these words the precise sense which our theory gave to them.(Ch. 7 ?3)

I conclude, then, that the theory stated inChapters IandIIis right so far as it merely asserts three principles (1) That thereissome characteristic which belongs and must belong to absolutelyallright voluntary actions and tonowrong ones; (2) That one such characteristic consists in the fact that the total consequences of right actions must always be as good, intrinsically, as any which it waspossiblefor the agent to produce under the circumstances (it being uncertain, however, in what sense precisely the word損ossible?/Q> is to be understood), whereas this can never be true of wrong ones; and (3) That if any set of consequencesAis once intrinsically better than another setB, any set precisely similar toAmust always be intrinsically better than a set precisely similar toB. We have, indeed, not considered all the objections which might be urged against these three principles; but we have, I think, considered all those which are most commonly urged,with one single exception. And I must now briefly state what this one remaining objection is, before I go on to point out the respect in which this theory which was stated inChapters IandII, seems to me to be utterly wrong, in spite of being right as to all these three points.(Ch. 7 ?4)

This one last objection may be called the objection of Egoism; and it consists in asserting that no agent can ever be under any obligation to do the action, whosetotalconsequences will be the best possible,ifits total effects uponhim, personally, are not the best possible; or in other words that it always would berightfor an agent to choose the action whose total effects uponhimselfwould be the best, even ifabsolutely allits effects (taking into account its effects on other beings as well) wouldnotbe the best. It asserts in short that it can never be the duty of any agent to sacrifice his own good to the general good. And most people, who take this view, are, I think, content to assert this, without asserting further that it must always be his positivedutyto prefer his own good to the general good. That is to say, they will admit that a man may be actingrightly, even if hedoessacrifice his own good to the general good; they only hold that he will be actingequallyrightly, if he doesnot. But there are some philosophers who seem to hold that it mustalwaysbe an agent抯 positive duty to do what is best forhimself?SPAN class=emphasis>always, for instance, to do what will conduce most to his own損erfection,?/Q> or his own salvation, or his own搒elf-realisation?/Q>; who imply, therefore, that it would be his duty so to act, even if the action in question didnothave the best possible consequences upon the whole.(Ch. 7 ?5)

Now the question, whether this view is true, in either of these two different forms, would, of course, be of no practical importance, if it were true that, as a matter of fact, every action which most promotes the general good alwaysalsomost promotes the agent抯 own good, andvice versa. And many philosophers have taken great pains to try to show that thisisthe case: some have even tried to show that itmustnecessarily be the case. But it seems to me that none of the arguments which have been used to prove this proposition really do show that it is by any meansuniversallytrue. A case, for instance, may arise in which, if a man is to secure the best consequences for the world as a whole, it may be absolutely necessary that he should sacrifice his own life. And those who maintain that, even in such a case, he will absolutely always be securing the greatest possible amount of goodfor himself, must either maintain that in some future life he will receive goods sufficient to compensate him for all that he might have had during many years of continued life in this world梐 view to which there is the objection that it may be doubted, whether we shall have any future life at all, and that it is even more doubtful, what,ifwe shall, that life will be like; or else they must maintain the following paradox.(Ch. 7 ?6)

Suppose there are two men,AandB, who up to the age of thirty have lived lives of equal intrinsic value; and that at that age it becomes the duty of each to sacrifice his life for the general good. SupposeAdoes his duty and sacrifices his life, butBdoes not, and continues to live for thirty more years. Those who hold that the agent抯 own goodalwayscoincides with the general good, must then hold thatB抯 sixty years of life, no matter how well the remaining thirty years of it may be spent, cannot possibly have so much intrinsic value asA抯 thirty years. And surely this is an extravagant paradox, however much intrinsic value we may attribute to the final moments ofA抯 life in which he does his duty at the expense of his life; and however high we put the loss in intrinsic value to B抯 life, which arises from the fact that, in this one instance, he failed to do his duty.Bmay, for instance, repent of this one act and the whole of the remainder of his life may be full of the highest goods; and it seems extravagant to maintain that all the goods there may be in this last thirty years of it cannot possibly be enough to make his life more valuable, intrinsically, than that ofA.(Ch. 7 ?7)

I think, therefore, we must conclude that a maximum of true good, for ourselves, is by no means always secured by those actions which are necessary to secure a maximum of true good for the world as a whole; and hence that itisa question of practical importance, whether, in such cases of conflict, it is always a duty, or right, for us to prefer our own good to the general good. And this is a question which, so far as I can see, it is impossible to decide by argument one way or the other. If any person, after clearly considering the question, comes to the conclusion that he can never be under any obligation to sacrifice his own good to the general good, if theywereto conflict, or even that it would be wrong for him to do so, it is, I think, impossible to prove that he is mistaken. But it is certainly equally impossible for him to prove that he is not mistaken. And, for my part, it seems to me quite self-evident that he is mistaken. It seems to me quite self-evident that it must always be our duty to do what will produce the best effectsupon the whole, no matter how bad the effects upon ourselves may be and no matter how much good we ourselves may lose by it.(Ch. 7 ?8)

I think, therefore, we may safely reject this last objection to the principle that it must always be the duty of every agent to do that one, among all the actions which hecando on any given occasion, whosetotal consequenceswill have the greatest intrinsic value; and we may conclude, therefore, that the theory stated inChapters IandIIis right as toall the three points yet considered, except for the doubt as to the precise sense in which the words揷an do?/Q> are to be understood in this proposition. But obviously on any theory which maintains, as this one does, that right and wrong depend on the intrinsic value of the consequences of our actions, it is extremely important to decide rightly what kinds of consequencesareintrinsically better or worse than others. And it is on this important point that the theory in question seems to me to take an utterly wrong view. It maintains, aswe saw in Chapter II, that any whole which containsmore pleasureis always intrinsically better than one which contains less, and that none can be intrinsically better,unlessit contains more pleasure; it being remembered that the phrase搈ore pleasure,?/Q> in this statement, is not to be understood as meaning strictly what is says, butas standing for any one of five different alternatives, the nature of which wasfully explained in our first two chapters. And the last question we have to raise, is, therefore: Is this proposition true or not? and if not, whatisthe right answer to the question: What kinds of things are intrinsically better or worse than others?(Ch. 7 ?9)

And first of all it is important to be quite clear as to how this question is related to another question, which is very liable to be confused with it: namely the question whetherthe proposition which was distinguished in Chapter I, as formingthe first partof the theory there stated, is true or not: I mean, the proposition that quantity of pleasure is a correctcriterionof right and wrong, or that,in this world, it always is,as a matter of fact, our duty to do the action which will produce a maximum of pleasure, or (for this is, perhaps, more commonly held) to do the action which,so far as we can see, will produce such a maximum. This latter proposition has been far more oftenexpresslyheld than the proposition that what contains more pleasure isalwaysintrinsically better than what contains less; and many people may be inclined to think they are free to maintain it, even if they deny that the intrinsic value of every whole isalwaysin proportion to the quantity of pleasure it contains. And so,in a sense, they are; for it is quite possible,theoretically, that quantity of pleasure should always be a correctcriterionof right and wrong, here in this world, even if intrinsic value is not always in exact proportion to quantity of pleasure. But though this is theoretically possible, it is, I think, easy to see that it is extremelyunlikelyto be the case. For if it were the case, what it would involve is this. It would involve our maintaining that, where the total consequences of any actual voluntary action have more intrinsic value than those of the possible alternatives, itabsolutely alwayshappens to be true that theyalsocontain more pleasure, although in other cases, we know that degree of intrinsic value is by no means always in proportion to quantity of pleasure contained. And, of course, it is theoretically possible that this should be so: it ispossiblethat the total consequences of actual voluntary actions should form a complete exception to the general rule: that, in their case, what has more intrinsic value shouldabsolutely alwaysalso contain more pleasure, although, in other cases, this is by no means always true: but anybody can see, I think, that in the absence of strict proof that it is so, the probabilities are all the other way. It is, indeed, so far as I can see, quite impossible absolutely toproveeither that it is so or that it is not so; becauseactualactions in this world are liable to have such an immense number of indirect and remote consequences, which we cannot trace, that it is impossible to be quite certain how thetotalconsequences of any two actions will compare either in respect of intrinsic value, or in respect of the quantity of pleasure they contain. Itmay, therefore,possiblybe the case that quantity of pleasureis, as a matter of fact, a correctcriterionof right and wrong, even if intrinsic value isnotalways in proportion to quantity of pleasure contained. But it is impossible toprovethat it is a correct criterion, except by assuming that intrinsic value alwaysisin proportion to quantity of pleasure. And most of those who have held the former view have, I think, in fact made this assumption, even if they have not definitely realised that they were making it.(Ch. 7 ?10)

Is this assumption true, then? Is it true that one whole will be intrinsically better than another, whenever and only when it contains more pleasure, no matter what the two may be like in other respects? It seems to me almost impossible that any one, who fully realises the consequences of such a view, can possibly hold that itistrue. It involves our saying, for instance, that a world in which absolutely nothing except pleasure existed梟o knowledge, no love, no enjoyment of beauty, no moral qualities梞ust yet be intrinsically better梑etter worth creating梡rovided only the total quantity of pleasure in it were the least bit greater, than one in which all these things existedas well aspleasure. It involves our saying that, even if the total quantity of pleasure in each was exactly equal, yet the fact that all the beings in the one possessed in addition knowledge of many different kinds and a full appreciation of all that was beautiful or worthy of love in their world, whereasnoneof the beings in the other possessed any of these things, would give us no reason whatever for preferring the former to the latter. It involves our saying that, for instance, the state of mind of a drunkard, when he is intensely pleased with breaking crockery, is just as valuable, in itself梛ust as well worth having, as that of a man who is fully realising all that is exquisite inthe tragedy of King Lear, provided only the mere quantity of pleasure in both cases is the same. Such instances might be multiplied indefinitely, and it seems to me that they constitute areductio ad absurdumof the view that intrinsic value is always in proportion to quantity of pleasure. Of course, here again, the question is quite incapable of proof either way. And if anybody, after clearly considering the issue, does come to the conclusion that no one kind of enjoyment is ever intrinsically better than another, provided only that the pleasure in both is equally intense, and that, if wecouldget as much pleasure in the world, without needing to have any knowledge, or any moral qualities, or any sense of beauty, as we can getwiththem, then all these things would be entirely superfluous, there is no way of proving that he is wrong. But it seems to me almost impossible that anybody, who does really get the question clear, should take such a view; and, if anybody were to, I think it is self-evident that he would be wrong.(Ch. 7 ?11)

It may, however, be asked: If the matter is as plain as this, how has it come about that anybody ever has adopted the view that intrinsic valueisalways in proportion to quantity of pleasure, or has ever argued, as if it were so? And I think one chief answer to this question is that those who have done so havenotclearly realised all the consequences of their view, partly because they have been too exclusively occupied with the particular question as to whether, in the case ofthe total consequencesofactualvoluntary actions, degree of intrinsic value is not always in proportion to quantity of pleasure梐 question, which, as has been admitted, is, in itself, much more obscure. But there is, I think, another reason, which is worth mentioning, because it introduces us to a principle of great importance. It may, in fact, be held, with great plausibility, that no whole can ever have any intrinsic valueunlessit contains some pleasure; and it might be thought, at first sight, that this reasonable, and perhaps true, view could not possibly lead to the wholly unreasonable one that intrinsic value is alwaysin proportionto quantity of pleasure; it might seem obvious that to say that nothing can be valuablewithoutpleasure is a very different thing from saying that intrinsic value is alwaysin proportionto pleasure. And it is, I think, in fact true that the two views are really as different as they seem, and that the latter does not at all follow from the former. But, if we look a little closer, we may, I think, see a reason why the latter should very naturally have beenthoughtto follow from the former.(Ch. 7 ?12)

The reason is as follows. If we say that no whole can ever be intrinsically good,unlessit contains some pleasure, we are, of course, saying that if from any whole, which is intrinsically good, we were to subtract all the pleasure it contains, the remainder, whatever it might be, would have no intrinsic goodness at all, but must always be either intrinsicallybador else intrinsically indifferent: and this (if we rememberour definition of intrinsic value) is the same thing as to say that this remainder actuallyhasno intrinsic goodness at all, but alwaysiseither positively bad or indifferent. Let us call the pleasure which such a whole containsA, and the whole remainder, whatever it may be,B. We are then saying that the wholeA+Bis intrinsically good, but thatBisnotintrinsically good at all. Surely it seems to follow that the intrinsic value ofA+Bcannot possibly be greater than that ofAby itself? How, it may be asked, could it possibly be otherwise? How, by addingAto something, namelyB, which hasnointrinsic goodness at all, could we possibly get a whole which hasmoreintrinsic goodness thanA? It may naturally seem to be self-evident that we could not. But, if so, then it absolutely follows that we can never increase the value of any whole whatever except by addingpleasureto it: we may, of course,lessenits value by adding other things,e.g.by adding pain; but we can neverincreaseit except by adding pleasure.(Ch. 7 ?13)

Now from this it does not, of course, follow strictly that the intrinsic value of a whole is alwaysin proportionto the quantity of pleasure it contains in the special sense in which we have throughout been using this expression梩hat is to say, as meaning that it is in proportion to theexcessof pleasure over pain, in one ofthe five senses explained in Chapter I. But it is surely very natural to think that it does. And itdoesfollow that we must be wrong in the reasons we gave for disputing this proposition. It does follow that we must be wrong in thinking that by adding such things as knowledge or a sense of beauty to a world which contained a certain amount of pleasure, without adding any more pleasure, we could increase the intrinsic value of that world. If, therefore, we are to dispute the proposition that intrinsic valueisalways in proportion to quantity of pleasure we must dispute this argument. But the argument may seem to be almost indisputable. It has, in fact, been used as an argument in favour of the proposition that intrinsic valueisalways in proportion to quantity of pleasure, and I think it has probably had much influence in inducing people to adopt that view, even if they have not expressly put it in this form.(Ch. 7 ?14)

How, then, can we dispute this argument? We might, of course, do so, by rejecting the proposition that no whole can ever be intrinsically good,unlessit contains some pleasure; but, for my part, though I don抰 feel certain that this propositionistrue, I also don抰 feel at all certain that it isnottrue. The part of the argument which seems to me certainly can and ought to be disputed is another part梟amely, the assumption that, where a whole contains two factors,AandB, and one of these,B, has no intrinsic goodness at all, the intrinsic value of the whole cannot begreaterthan that of the other factor,A. This assumption, I think, obviously rests on a still more general assumption, of which it is only a special case. The general assumption is: That where a whole consists of two factorsAandB, the amount by which its intrinsic value exceeds that of one of these two factors must always be equal to that of the other factor. Our special case will follow from this general assumption: because it will follow that ifBbe intrinsicallyindifferent, that is to say, if its intrinsic value = 0, then the amount by which the value of the wholeA+Bexceeds the value ofAmust also = 0, that is to say, the value of the whole must be preciselyequalto that ofA; while ifBbe intrinsicallybad, that is to say, if its intrinsic value is less than 0, then the amount by which the value ofA+Bwill exceed that ofAwill also be less than 0, that is to say, the value of the whole will belessthan that ofA. Our special case does then follow from the general assumption; and nobody, I think, would maintain that the special case was true without maintaining that the general assumption was also true. The general assumption may, indeed, very naturally seem to be self-evident; it has, I think, been generally assumed that it is so: and it may seem to be a mere deduction from the laws of arithmetic. But, so far as I can see, it isnota mere deduction from the laws of arithmetic, and, so far from being self-evident, it is certainly untrue.(Ch. 7 ?15)

Let us see exactly what we are saying, if we deny it. We are saying that the fact thatAandBbothexist together, together with the fact that they have to one another any relation which they do happen to have (when they exist together, they always must havesomerelation to one another; and the precise nature of the relation certainly may in some cases make a great difference to the value of the whole state of things, though, perhaps, it need not in all cases)梩hat these two factstogethermust have a certain amount of intrinsic value, that is to say must be either intrinsically good, or intrinsically bad, or intrinsically indifferent, and that the amount by which this value exceeds the value which the existence ofAwould have, ifAexisted quite alone,neednot be equal to the value which the existence ofBwould have, ifBexisted quite alone. This is all that we are saying. And can any one pretend that such a view necessarily contradicts the laws of arithmetic? or that it is self-evident that it cannot be true? I cannot see any ground for saying so; and if there is no ground, then the argument which sought to show that we can never add to the value of any wholeexceptby adding pleasure to it, is entirely baseless.(Ch. 7 ?16)

If, therefore, we reject the theory that intrinsic value is always in proportion to quantity of pleasure, it does seem as if we may be compelled to accept the principle thatthe amount by which the value of a whole exceeds that of one of its factors is not necessarily equal to that of the remaining factor梐 principle which, if true, is very important in many other cases. But, though at first sight this principle may seem paradoxical, there seems to be no reason why we should not accept it; while there are other independent reasons why we should accept it. And, in any case, it seems quite clear that the degree of intrinsic value of a whole isnotalways in proportion to the quantity of pleasure it contains.(Ch. 7 ?17)

But, if we do reject this theory, what, it may be asked, can we substitute for it? How can we answer the question, what kinds of consequences are intrinsically better or worse than others?(Ch. 7 ?18)

We may, I think, say, first of all, that for the same reason for which we have rejected the view that intrinsic value is always in proportion to quantity of pleasure, we must also reject the view that it is always in proportion to the quantity of any othersinglefactor whatever. Whatever single kind of thing may be proposed as a measure of intrinsic value, instead of pleasure梬hether knowledge, or virtue, or wisdom, or love梚t is, I think, quite plain that it is not such a measure; because it is quite plain that, however valuable any one of these things may be, we may always add to the value of a whole which contains any one of them, not only by adding some more of that one, but alsoby adding something else instead. Indeed, so far as I can see, there is no characteristic whatever which always distinguishes every whole which has greater intrinsic value from every whole which has less,exceptthe fundamental one that it would always be the duty of every agent to prefer the better to the worse, if he had to choose between a pair of actions, of which they would be thesoleeffects. And similarly, so far as I can see, there is no characteristic whatever which belongs to all things that are intrinsicallygoodand only to them梕xcept simply the one that they allareintrinsically good andoughtalways to be preferred tonothing at all, if we had to choose between an action whose sole effect would be one of them and one which would have no effects whatever. The fact is that the view which seems to me to be true is the one which, apart from theories, I think every one would naturally take, namely, that there are animmense varietyof different things,allof which are intrinsically good; and that though all these things may perhaps have some characteristicin common, their variety is so great that they have none, which,besidesbeing common to them all, is alsopeculiarto them梩hat is to say, which never belongs to anything which is intrinsically bad or indifferent. All that can, I think, be done by way of making plain what kinds of things are intrinsically good or bad, and what are better or worse than others, is to classify some of the chief kinds of each, pointing out what the factors are upon which their goodness or badness depends. And I think this is one of the most profitable things which can be done in Ethics, and one which has been too much neglected hitherto. But I have not space to attempt it here.(Ch. 7 ?19)

I have only space for two final remarks. The first is that there do seem to be two important characteristics, which arecommonto absolutely all intrinsic goods, though not peculiar to them. Namely (1) it does seem as if nothing can be an intrinsic good unless it containsbothsome feeling andalsosome other form of consciousness; and, as we have said before, it seems possible that amongst the feelings contained must always be some amount of pleasure. And (2) it does also seem as if every intrinsic good must be a complex whole containing a considerable variety of different factors梐s if, for instance, nothing so simple as pleasure by itself, however intense, could ever be any good. But it is important to insist (though it is obvious) that neither of these characteristics ispeculiarto intrinsic goods; they may obviouslyalsobelong to things bad and indifferent. Indeed, as regards the first, it is not only true that many wholes which contain both feeling and some other form of consciousness are intrinsically bad; but it seems also to be true that nothing can be intrinsically bad,unlessit contains some feeling.(Ch. 7 ?20)

The other final remark is that we must be very careful to distinguish the two questions (1) whether, and in what degree, a thing isintrinsicallygood and bad, and (2) whether, and in what degree, it is capable of adding to or subtracting from the intrinsic value of a whole of which it forms a part, from a third, entirely different question, namely (3) whether, and in what degree, a thing isusefuland has goodeffects, orharmfuland hasbadeffects. All three questions are very liable to be confused, because, in common life, we apply the names揼ood?/Q> and揵ad?/Q> to things of all three kinds indifferently: when we say that a thing is揼ood?/Q> we may mean either (1) that it is intrinsically good or (2) that it adds to the value of many intrinsically good wholes or (3) that it is useful or has good effects; and similarly when we say that a thing is bad we may mean any one of the three corresponding things. And such confusion is very liable to lead to mistakes, of which the following are, I think, the commonest. In the first place, people are apt to assume with regard to things, which really are very good indeed in senses (1) or (2), that they are scarcely any good at all, simply because they do not seem to be of muchuse梩hat is to say, to lead tofurthergood effects; and similarly, with regard to things which really are very bad in senses (1) or (2), it is very commonly assumed that there cannot be much, if any, harm in them, simply because they do not seem to lead tofurtherbad results. Nothing is commoner than to find people asking of a good thing: Whatuseis it? and concluding that, if it is no use, it cannot be any good; or asking of a bad thing: What harm does it do? and concluding that if itdoesno harm, there cannot be any harminit. Or, again, by a converse mistake, of things which really are very useful, but are not good at all in senses (1) or (2), it is very commonly assumed that theymustbe good in one or both of these two senses. Or again, of things, which really are very good in senses (1) and (2), it is assumed that, because they are good, they cannot possibly do harm. Or finally, of things, which are neither intrinsically good nor useful, it assumed that they cannot be any good at all, although in fact they are very good in sense (2). All these mistakes are liable to occur, because, in fact, the degree of goodness or badness of a thing in any one of these three senses is by no means always in proportion to the degree of its goodness or badness in either of the other two; but if we are careful to distinguish the three different questions, they can, I think, all be avoided.(Ch. 7 ?21)




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